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  This paper makes an important contri-
bution to the ongoing debate over the validity 
of the psychological construct, ADHD.  While 
not ruling out the possibility that something of 
value may lie at the core of this diagnosis, the 
authors articulate a clear set of problems with 
the research logic that forms the foundation of 
the disorder itself, reaching the conclusion that 
there appears to be insufﬁ  cient, valid scientiﬁ  c 
evidence for the demarcation of a coherent and 
independent disease entity.  Foremost among 
these problems is, arguably, the inability of the 
ADHD advocates to structure their investigative 
studies around the possibility of hypothesis refu-
tation, rather than simply constant conﬁ  rmation.   
As such, the dominant model of ADHD research 
largely seems to involve ﬁ  nding data that cor-
roborates a pre-existing belief in the disorder’s 
legitimacy.  The authors make their case effec-
tively and thoughtfully.
  As a way of articulating some of the 
epistemological ﬂ  aws in ADHD reasoning, the 
production of truth is dichotomised within the 
paper into two contrasting approaches, a ‘top 
down’ model, one that locates truth within the 
utterances of the powerful (eg. the dictates of 
scientiﬁ  c experts), and a ‘bottom up’ approach, 
as characterised by rigorous scientiﬁ  c observa-
tion and testing, followed by the formulation of 
empirically valid and replicable psychological 
entities (eg. a proper use of the scientiﬁ  c meth-
od).  While recognizing the utility of this artiﬁ  ce 
within the logic of this paper, it does raise two 
fundamental questions about such a description 
of the production of truth.  The ﬁ  rst is whether 
this somewhat reductionist model of truth pro-
duction masks more than it elucidates, after all, 
as Foucault (1980) points out, truth is linked in 
a circular relation between the systems of power 
that produce it, and the effects of power which it 
induces.  So, whereas the authority/truth binary 
of the ‘top down’ model certainly has currency 
within modernist discourses, particularly those 
surrounding constructs such as ADHD, it may be 
counter-productive to view this in opposition to 
truths produced through the practical, mundane 
mechanics of data collection and analysis.
  Linked to this concern, the second ques-
tion involves the apparent faith placed by the 
authors in the scientiﬁ  c method, the implication 
being that the ‘bottom up’ approach, as guided 
by a idealised version of that method, produces 
a form of truth stripped of the ﬂ  aws of the ‘top 
down’ model—vested interest, bias, truth by 
committee—perhaps even the truth (‘eventual 
empirical veriﬁ  cation’).  Setting aside questions 
of what this latter objective might actually en-
compass, the issue here is it has been argued, 
often convincingly, that what is being asked 
of the scientiﬁ  c method is actually beyond its 
scope.  As Feyerabend (1978) notes, the ‘rigor-
ous’ scientiﬁ  c method is, in practical terms, sim-
ply a generally nebulous collection of rules and 
procedures, applied unevenly and pragmatically, 
and supplemented by other equally unscientiﬁ  c 
methods, results, biases, and presuppositions.   
Certainly, not the promised land of truth-detec-
tion.
  These relatively minor quibbles aside, 
the two high points of an already-excellent paper 
involve, ﬁ  rst, the observation that all attempts to 
place ADHD on a sound epistemological footing 
may well be a waste of time, and that perhaps a 
return to ﬁ  rst principles is in order.  Second, the 
authors should be congratulated for the wonder-
fully articulate, and appropriate, way they con-
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clude their paper.  These two sentences should 
be a mandatory ending for all academic articles, 
scientiﬁ  c or otherwise.  If only some research-
ers into ADHD possessed a similar grasp of the 
limits of their own truth claims.
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